ULFA Talks (Mamoni Raisom Goswami)
From WikiAssam
In the second half of 2004, the efforts of Mamoni Raisom Goswami brings the ULFA and the Government of India GOI very close to talks. The unique nature of this episode has been a high visibility of the entire process: the ULFA, the mediator and the GOI have made public statements, and some of the documents that have been exchanged are now public. Usually negotiations in such cases, at least in the initial stages, are highly secret.
A second feature is that the effort comes not from the GOI but from outside it [1]. The success of these efforts seems to depend crucially on the public demand for peace talks, which probably explains the public nature of these contacts, and the personality of Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister and MP from Assam.
Contents |
Developments
ULFA climbdown on the pre-conditions
The three ULFA pre-conditions for talks, which the GOI has always rejected, are
- Negotiate with GOI in a foreign land.
- Negotiate in the presence of UN officials.
- Negotiation agenda should include the issue of sovereignty of Assam.
The ULFA in the period following the October 2004 Militancy gave up the first two pre-conditions. But it retained the third pre-condition on the claim that that was the main point of its twenty-five year old struggle and that it cannot give it up.
Beginning of a possibility
After the Dhemaji explosions by ULFA, the strong public opinion for peace talks and an end to the conflict was expressed in the September 21 Jatiya Mahasabha resolution that called on both the ULFA and the GOI to begin peace talks. The Jatiya Mahasabha was organized by the AJYCP to which most of the top ULFA leadership once belonged. But beginning October 2, 2004 the ULFA and NDFB began a series of attacks on combatants and civilians. On October 8 NDFB, with which the ULFA synchronized the attacks, announces a unilateral ceasefire as a step toward peace talks. As the issue of talks with NDFB progresses in fits and starts, it becomes clear that Mamoni Goswami was been making her own efforts to bring in the ULFA too for talks. She announces that in talks, sovereignty has to be an issue [2].
On November 16 Mamoni Raisom Goswami meets the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and hands over a memorandum drafted by the writer in consultation with academics from Delhi University, like Prof. Manoranjan Mahanty [3]. On November 18 Arabinda Rajkhowa confirms that the ULFA would enter a dialogue if the ULFA was invited on the Government of India's letterhead with a signature and the official seal, and with sovereignty on the agenda [4].
The issue of sovereignty
(Discuss "sovereignty on the agenda" here in the context of talks, not sovereignty of Assam) [5]
The issue of sovereignty is an important issue that ULFA insists on, and which GOI feels it might not be able to include due to constitutional barriers. Both Mamoni Raisom Goswami as well as the GOI are consulting legal teams for an interpretation of sovereignty and its place in the Indian Constitution. Mamoni Goswami has consulted Soli Sorabjee. Legal opinion seems to be that there could be various kinds of sovereignty, some of which are not against the Constitution [6]. Economic sovereignty is a possibility, for instance.
The issue of the British presence
On a minor aside, the ULFA makes a comment that the British knew more about the history and the social and political dynamics of northeast India and should be included in the talks. Is ULFA bringing back one of the pre-conditions?
PMO Letter
The possibility of talks increases and just as suddenly nearly disappears with a letter from the PMO. On December 6, M K Narayanan, internal security adviser at the PMO, writes to Goswami expressing the government's willingness to hold talks provided ULFA give up violence. The ULFA rejects this offer because of the self contradictions in the letter and not for mentioning the issue of sovereignty [7]. The reaction to this development ranges from the critics of ULFA [8] to those who feel that the GOI made a mistake [9].
Despite this setback, Goswami continues her efforts by working with her advisers at Delhi University to get GOI produce the assurances the ULFA is seeking, and by maintaining her links with the ULFA [10] [11]. Subsequently, Goswami hands over a second letter to the PM on December 11 [12] which was later approved by Paresh Baruah. The latest reports indicate that there is some opposition to the PM writing a signed letter [13].
Complications
The ULFA strikes on the "Revenge day" [14] seems to have complicated the issue. This is a definite rebuff of the Narayanan letter that called for "giving up violence".
Documents
Goswami has mentioned that she would publicly release her initial memorandum and the M K Narayanan letter at the opportune time.
Paresh Baruah's illness
In a significant development, the ULFA Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa has reported that Paresh Baruah has suddenly taken ill and has been shifted to a place with better medical facilities for surgery [15]. This has resulted in various kinds of speculations [16]. Arabinda Rajkhowa finally gets in touch with Goswami and updates her on Paresh Baruah's surgery [17]. Since the unavailability of Paresh Baruah has made progress difficult, Goswami discusses with ULFA leaders in Guwahati central jail means to maintain the momentum for talks [18] [19].
Ultimately, it turned out that it was an illness after all [20], setting to rest the speculations that the illness had something to do with a power struggle within ULFA.
ULFA Chairman's letter
After much speculations that the talks are doomed, Narayanan has finally conveyed the government decision to reply formally to the ULFA chairman's letter [21].
Lessons/Questions on Negotiations
- It seems the ULFA was expecting a written invitation from the Prime Minister with the assurance that the issue of sovereignty will be on the agenda. Could Goswami convey this adequately to the GOI? If she did, did the GOI decide to ignore it? Is GOI incapable of doing it due to legal issues, or was it a negotiating tactic to not mention it?
- Are all negotiations where initial contacts are made in public bound to fail? The Oslo Accords, the LTTE-Sri Lanka negotiations, the NSCN(IM)-GOI negotiations were all initiated and conducted in secrecy. They were made public only when some progress was made, though none of them have resolved the respective conflicts yet. So was it a mistake for Goswami to go public at each and every step?
- The present efforts come from an extra-government agent. In this case, Mamoni Goswami, who probably felt empowered by the public call for peace talks at the Jatiya Mahasabha to go forward. For negotiations to succeed, is it essential, in the Indian context, for the effort to begin within the government?
Comparisons
NSCN(IM)
- Both the ULFA and the NSCN(IM) had identical sets of pre-conditions for talks.Though the ULFA has explicitly given up two of them, the NSCN(IM) did not give up any one of the pre-conditions. There were contacts that were made in foreign countries, and the issue of sovereignty is no longer mentioned in public.
- The GOI had courted the NSCN(IM) for long. The initial contacts were made by Rajesh Pilot, continued by Swaraj Kaushal and presently the chief negotiator is K Padmanabiah. There are indications that H D Deva Gowda, PM of India, had actually met NSCN(IM) leader in Bangkok in February 1997. In contrast the efforts for talks with ULFA have come from Goswami and the public opinion generated by the Jatiya Mahasabha.
- In contrast to the very high public visibility here, the NSCN(IM) talks have been very secretive. [22]
External Links
- Bargain Basement Wasbir Hussein on the clamor for talks.
- ULFA: Playing Hard to Get Bibhu Prasad Routray, SAIR Volume 3, No. 22, December 13, 2004
- Writer's Peace Profile on Mamoni Raisom Goswami by Samudra Gupta Kashyap, Indian Express.
